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This article is the result of research conducted during the visit to the Archives of Yugoslavia, 
and the Diplomatic Archive of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, where the Yugoslav 
Foreign Office material is kept today. The documents used for this article are mainly those by the 
Foreign Secretariat of SFRY, Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) and Cabinet 
of the President Tito. The Yugoslav involvement in the Palestinian problem might be divided into two 
stages  and  three  levels.  The  first  stage  refers  to  the  immediate  post  World  War  II  period  when 
Yugoslavia, as a member of UNSCOP1,  was directly involved in UN’s efforts to find a sustainable 
solution for the future of Palestine. The second stage started after 1955 when Yugoslavia started to  
implement its new foreign policy which aimed to align it with predominantly third world countries. Such 
efforts culminated in 1961 when the Non-Aligned Movement was created in Belgrade. The second 
stage had significantly more substance than the first one: it saw an active Yugoslav role in promoting 
the rights of the Palestinian refugees, and after the 1967 June war the promotion of the Palestinian 
people’s right to self-determination and statehood. 
Yugoslavia’s first involvement in the Palestinian problem started with the United Nation’s initial 
efforts to solve the Middle Eastern crises which arose from the United Kingdom’s decision to suddenly  
end its mandate in Palestine. As a member of UNSCOP, Yugoslavia backed the adoption of the so-
called minority plan in August 1947, together with India and Iran, also members. The plan envisaged 
the establishing of a Federal State of Palestine that would comprise of an Arab and a Jewish State. In 
accordance with this, the population of Palestine would elect  a constituent assembly, whose main 
purpose would be to adopt the Constitution of the new Federal State.  The plan also included the  
creation of single Palestinian nationality and citizenship which would be granted to Arabs, Jews and 
other ethnic groups. Jerusalem would become the capital of this Federal State, and would be divided  
in two municipalities, with predominant Arab and Jewish population. 
Such  proposal  resembled  Yugoslavia’s  own  historic  path:  the  creation  of  a  post  war 
constituent assembly formally elected by the entire Yugoslav population, and the creation of a Federal  
State; the establishing of the Yugoslav nation and citizenship with emphasis on equality between the 
nations. Yugoslavia’s proposal for Palestine was not adopted since the majority of the UN members -  
1 UN General Assembly at its first Special Session established the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in  
April 1947. Its member states were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala,  India,  Iran, Netherlands,  
Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. UNSCOP's task was to prepare the proposals of possible solutions for  
the problem of Palestine. UNSCOP proposed two competing plans; a majority plan that envisaged a partition  
with the economic union, and a minority plan of creating a Federal State of Palestine, Jovanović 1985: 111. 
Kirisci 1986: 4-5; Pogany 1984: 21-22.
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33 countries  altogether,  including  the  Eastern  Bloc  –  voted  for  the  partition  plan  at  the  General 
Assembly's second regular session. Yugoslavia abstained from voting with nine other UN members, 
and 13 members voted against the partition plan, 10 of which were predominantly Islamic countries. 
From then on, Yugoslavia was not politically involved in the Middle East crisis until the Suez crisis 
broke out in 1956. However, Yugoslavia was active in the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine) which dealt mainly with the problem of Palestinian refugees. 
Yugoslavia put the question of Palestinian refugees to the UN General Assembly for the first 
time at its Fifth session. Yugoslav attitude was that the refugee problem needed to be resolved as 
soon as possible since the Israel state was already established and the relations with the Arab states 
were regulated by the Armistice. At the same time, Yugoslav attitude was that recommendations to 
bring the Arab refugees back to Israel should not be pursued at any price. Interestingly, in the pre-
1956  period  Yugoslavia’s  attitude  to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  was  neutral  and,  in  some  cases, 
Yugoslavia  even  preferred  the  Israeli  claims  over  the  Arab  ones.  Even  Yugoslav  diplomats 
acknowledged in their  reports  that  the Yugoslav diplomacy at the time was more in favour of the 
Jewish than the Arab side. Similarly, Yugoslavia always supported Israel’s right to existence, and in 
1948 the Yugoslav representative in the United Nations declared that "there is no justification for the  
Arab claim on the entire territory of Palestine. The Jewish state and nation exist and their existence  
cannot be denied. That nation has the right to independence and national state."
In the period between 1948 and 1954 Yugoslav history is predominantly marked by the Tito-
Stalin split. During this time, Yugoslavia, pressured economically and politically by the Soviet Union 
and its satellite states, refrained itself from any major international activity, apart from its very close 
cooperation  with  the  West.  The  only  significant  active  foreign  policy  field  was  within  the  United 
Nations.  The importance of  this  period for  Yugoslavia  lay in the transformation of  its  foreign and 
domestic policy orientation. The conflict with the Soviet Union obviously played a considerable role in 
this process. On the one hand, Yugoslavia had to justify its sudden shift towards intense economical  
and military cooperation with the West, since it  was a communist country. On the other, it  had to 
clearly show the differences between the Yugoslav and Soviet socialism. Therefore, from the early 
1950's Yugoslavia embarked on a new path marked by the policy of Self-management and gradually  
started to develop the policy of Nonalignment, which replaced the earlier system that purely copied the 
Soviet model. 
The  normalisation  of  relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  in  1955-56  did  not  change  the 
Yugoslav  unique  path  towards  socialism.  The  Yugoslav  regime  realised  that  balancing  the  two 
opposing cold war blocs can be a much better guarantor of security for the Yugoslav independency 
and  Tito's  communist  regime,  than  being  a  member  of  one  of  the  blocs.  The  policy  of  peaceful 
coexistence, formulated at the Bandung conference, and the cooperation with the newly independent  
African and Asian states seemed to be a good way of promoting Yugoslavia’s new foreign orientation.  
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Tito's month long trip to India and Burma in 1954 and his first meeting with the Egyptian president  
Nasser in early 1955 had a major role in the process of shifting Yugoslav foreign policy to the South, 
instead of the West or the East. 
Yugoslav  ties  with  Egypt,  Tito’s  and  Nasser’s  close  friendship,  and  Nasser's  strong  anti 
colonial attitudes most certainly influenced Tito and the Yugoslav policy in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Yugoslav interest for the Middle East, and Egypt in particular, had much broader scope after 
1955, comparing to the immediate post World War II period. Before 1953, not only did the conflict with 
the  Soviet  Union  prevent  any  substantial  relations  between  the  two  countries,  but  so  did  the 
anticommunist rhetoric of the Egyptian king Farouk. The military coup and the ascendancy of Colonel  
Nasser changed this: Nasser’s aim to modernize Egypt and reduce the influence of former colonial  
powers in the Middle East and North Africa suited Tito’s policy of promoting anti-imperialism and anti-
colonialism. Therefore,  the two leaders quickly established a very close personal  relationship  that 
lasted until Nasser’s death in 1970.
The first concrete situation in which the new Yugoslav role in the Middle East was realised was 
the Suez crisis. When Yugoslav attempts to mediate between Egypt and the West failed, following the 
Egyptian purchase of Czechoslovakian weapons, Yugoslavia offered Nasser its firm support in his 
decision to nationalise the Suez Canal. This included Yugoslavia’s support against the aggression on 
Egypt that came subsequently.2 As a member of the UN Security Council, Yugoslavia managed to 
bypass  British  and  French  vetoes  in  the  Security  Council  by  proposing  the  “Uniting  for  Peace” 
resolution that brought the Suez crisis to the General Assembly and therefore helped Egypt gain public 
support against the tripartite aggression.3 
The Suez crisis was an important impetus to Yugo-Egyptian relation. It was also the first major 
political act by Yugoslav diplomacy after the reconciliation with the Soviet Union and its first attempt to 
act  as  a  mediator  in  international  conflicts.  Another  important  consequence  of  the  crisis  was the 
change of Yugoslav attitude towards Israel. Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1956, together with British and 
French aggression, was condemned by Yugoslavia. Since then Yugoslavia’s relations with Israel will 
continue to fade until the complete break down of diplomatic relations in the 1967 War. 
After the foundation of the Nonaligned Movement in 1961, Yugoslavia was dealing with the 
Palestinian problem on three levels: acting within the Nonaligned Movement and the United Nations; 
supplying direct material and logistics to the Palestinian organisations; and through its diplomatic ties 
with  different  international  subjects  in  order  to  help  legitimize  PLO’s  position  as  the  legal 
representative of the Palestinian people. All three were equally important. However, the last lever i.e. 
Yugoslav intermediary role, is the one that has been explored the least, as well as perhaps being the 
2 Petrović 2008: 465.
3 Willetts 1978: 4.
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most complex one. Therefore, due to the complexity of this problem and the need to conduct a wider  
research, this aspect of the Yugoslav help to the Palestinian cause will not be explored in detail. 
Yugoslav  international  reputation  was  rooted  mainly  in  its  involvement  in  the  Nonaligned 
Movement. Along with Nehru and Nasser, Tito was one of the founding fathers of the Movement and 
one  of  its  main  wheels.  The  establishment  of  the  Nonaligned  Movement  in  Belgrade  in  1961 
institutionalized the principles which Yugoslavia had pursued since 1955, and created a platform for 
political and economic expression of the Third World countries. It also served as a good mean against 
the pressure of the Cold war blocks that quite often tried to simplify the complex nature of the newly 
freed societies and put them into a context of the existing bipolar world. The beginnings of the 1960's  
saw the peak of decolonization, both in Asia and Africa, and one of the natural goals of the newly 
founded Movement was to support the decolonisation and the national liberation movements that were 
arising in many countries fighting for the independence from their colonial masters. The best example  
and future model of the national liberation fight against the colonial rule was the Algerian struggle for  
independence  from  France.  Yugoslavia  actively  supported  the  Algerian  FLN  against  the  French 
colonial  rule,  including  the  shipment  of  material  and  arms,  and  by  the  late  1950’s  the  policy  of 
supporting revolutionary and liberation movements across Asia and Africa was built into the Yugoslav 
foreign relation strategy in the Third world. Yugoslav policy in the Algerian war became a model for 
future policy towards the National Liberation Movements. The FLN was defined and recognized as the 
legitimate representative of the Algerian people, as was the case with the PLO a decade later,.4 Since 
then  Yugoslavia  would  offer  political  and  material  support  to  the  liberation  and  revolutionary 
movements across Africa and Asia; in Indochina to the South Vietnamese PRG and Africa in Angola  
(MPLA, FNLA), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Guinea Bissau (PAIGC), South Africa (ANC, PAC), Namibia 
(SWAPO), Zimbabwe (ZAPU), Komori (MOLINACO), Somalia (FLCS). It was therefore not surprising 
that support for national liberation movements was one of the five criteria devised at the meeting of  
ambassadors from 19 countries assembled in Cairo in June 1961 to prepare the Belgrade Nonaligned 
Summit.5
The Palestinian liberation movement was no exception. It took some time before Yugoslavia, 
for  its  own  political  reasons,  started  to  support  the  Palestinian  cause  politically  and  materially. 
However, explicit support for this kind of national liberation struggle was given at every Nonalignment 
summit: in Belgrade in 1961, Kairo in 1964, Lusaka in 1970, Algeria 1973 and Colombo in 1976.6 The 
Palestinian case was primarily linked to the Middle East conflict and its players. The main promoters of 
the  Palestinian  rights  within  the  Nonaligned  were  Arab  countries  who  sought  the  solution  to  the 
Palestinian problem as a part of the Middle East conflict solution. In the early phases of the Palestinian 
struggle, through 1950s and 1960s, the Palestinians saw their biggest supporter in Egypt. Since Egypt 
4 Bogetić 2006: 145.
5 Jackson 1983: 41.
6 This only includes period until the PLO became a full member of the Movement. Palestinian problem was 
naturally the topic of every following Nonaligned Summit.
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was one of the founders of the Nonaligned movement and Nasser tended to represent himself as the 
leader of the Arab world and protector of Arab interests, it was quite natural (and unavoidable from the  
very  beginning)  that  the  Palestinian  question  would  have  an  important  role  in  the  Nonalignment 
agenda. 
The first Nonaligned summit in Belgrade in 1961 supported the "full restoration of all the rights  
of the Arab people of Palestine". But this term was quite ambiguous and did not define the meaning of 
the  Palestinian  rights,  as  was  the  case  with  a  clearer  Casablanca  resolution  that  called  for  the 
restoration of "all the legitimate rights" of the Arabs of Palestine. At the second summit in Cairo in 1964 
more  emphasis  was given  to  the  Palestinian  problem by  supporting  “the  inalienable  right  of  the 
Palestinians to self-determination in their struggle against colonialism and racism.”
The third summit in Lusaka in 1970 paid more attention to the Palestinian problem. Since the 
Cairo  summit,  the  circumstances  had  significantly  changed  in  favour  of  the  Palestinian  cause. 
Primarily,  Israel's  conduct  during  the  1967  war  damaged  its  reputation  with  the  majority  of  the 
Nonaligned countries and helped the Arab countries to link the nature of Israeli behaviour with the 
racist  regime  in  South  Africa.  Equally  important  was  a  much  broader  activity  of  the  Palestinian 
organisations and representatives after the 1967 war and Fattah's takeover of the PLO in the early 
1969. The Summit in Lusaka brought the first full resolution on the Middle East and condemned Israel 
for the occupation of the Arab territories. At the same time, the Summit emphasized that “ respect for  
the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine is a prerequisite to peace in the Middle East .” 
The representatives of the PLO were present for the first time at the Lusaka summit with the status of 
guest.7
The  summit  in  Algeria,  held  immediately  after  the  1973  Middle  East  War,  confirmed  and 
strengthened the Nonaligned commitment to the Palestinian cause, and its condemnation of the Israeli  
regime, which was more closely linked to the situation in South Africa. Such decision was the result of  
the Israel’s refusal to accept the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) mediation mission in November 
1971, but also a compromise between the Arab and African participants of the Summit. The Algerian 
meeting recognised the Palestinian struggle as a genuine national liberation movement and was given 
the same status as similar movements for independence.8 The PLO became an observer with the 
powers  to  participate  in  the  Summit's  deliberations  and  the  PLO  representative  was  among  14 
representatives of different national liberation movements recognized by the Movement. The Summit  
acknowledged the growing influence of the PLO by giving it the status of the "legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people and their legitimate struggle.”. 
At the Ministerial Meeting in March 1975 in Havana the Nonaligned brought its first separate 
resolution  on  Palestine,  and  confirmed  the  support  previously  given  to  the  "restoration  of  the 
7 Willetts 1978: 257.
8 Kirisci 1986: 82-84.
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Palestinian people's national rights and its right to self-determination.” Havana meeting clearly stated 
"its full and active support for the PLO in its struggle to restore the national rights of the Palestinian  
people, particularly their right to return to their homeland, the right to self-determination, sovereignty,  
independence and the creation of a national authority, by all  means .”9 Finally,  at the August 1975 
Foreign Ministers  Meeting in Lima, the PLO was given the status of  a full  participant  which was 
confirmed at the Fifth Colombo Summit in 1976. This decision was the final confirmation of Palestinian 
goals and the end of a long process, from the displaced Arab refugees to the political  rights and  
national struggle for independence.10 The Lima meeting is a good example of Yugoslav attitudes to the 
Palestinian question, and also its foreign policy in general. Along with the decision to give PLO full 
participant status, the conference also discussed the proposal by some Arab countries to expel or 
suspend Israel from the United Nations. Yugoslav officials were firmly against it, and had suggested to 
the Palestinian representative that this decision would only have an opposite effect.11 
The  deliberations  of  the  Nonaligned  summits  were  reflected  and  synchronised  with  their 
activities in the United Nations. The treatment of the Palestinian question in the United Nations was  
closely linked to the global trends that affected the world after the Second World War. In its early 
development, the United Nations was predominantly influenced by the Western bloc. This situation 
started to change in late 1950s and early 1960s,  when many African and Asian countries gained  
independence and became members of the United Nations. Not surprisingly, this change benefited the 
emergence of new groupings within the Third World membership, of which the Nonaligned was the  
most influential  because they were not  limited to  regional grouping,  as were some organisations.  
Instead, it shared similar economic and political views in many aspects. Therefore, the Nonaligned has 
become the most  numerous and most  vociferous organised  group within  the United  Nations that 
promoted Palestinian interests in the UN bodies. The base for the recognition of the PLO and other 
national  liberation  groups  by  the  UN  was  Resolution  1514: “Declaration  on  the  granting  of  
independence to colonial countries and peoples brought by the General Assembly in 1960.” However, 
it was only in late 1960s that the Palestinian question gained any political importance in the United  
Nations,  apart  from its  refugee aspect.  Even  after  the  1967  War,  the  General  Assembly  treated 
Palestinians as refugees, not a political entity. This was quite obvious in the Resolution 242 from 1967, 
which called only for the return of the Palestinian refugees to the occupied territories. 
The Palestinian right to self determination was not recognized before 1970 by the General  
Assembly. Only then, Resolution 2649 called for the “recognition of the right of peoples under colonial  
and alien domination to recognize and observe that right in accordance with the relevant international  
instruments  and  the  principles  and  spirit  of  the  Charter”12 The  phrase  “alien  domination”  was 
deliberately inserted to cover the Palestinian case. Following the 26th General Assembly session in 
9 Kirsci 1986: 83-84.
10 Minić 1979: 183; Willetts 1978: 35-36.
11 DASMIP, PA, 1975, fasc. 218, dos. 8, 438937, 13. 08. 1975.
12 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/14/IMG/NR034914.pdf?OpenElement
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1971, the intention of linking the Zionist regime in Israel with the Apartheid regime in South Africa had 
become a practice that started to gather support outside the narrow circle of Arab and African states. 
The  General  Assembly  Resolution  2787  specifically  emphasized  “the  inalienable  right  of  the 
Palestinian people to freedom, equality and self-determination and the legitimacy of their struggles to  
restore those rights.” The same resolution also confirmed “the legality of the peoples’ struggle for self-
determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in  
southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and  
Guinea (Bissau),  as well  as of the Palestinian people,  by all  available means consistent  with the  
Charter of the United Nations.”13 By 1973, the General Assembly had become the place of unequivocal 
support  for  the Palestinian right  to  self-determination and after  1973 for  the establishment  of  the 
independent Palestinian state. Although those demands got the support from the majority of members 
of the UN Security Council, in one form or another, these draft resolutions were never adopted due to 
US vetoes. 
Regardless  of  the  negative  US  attitude  in  the  Security  Council,  the  General  Assembly 
Resolution 3236, of 22 November 1974 affirmed “the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to  
national independency and sovereignty.” At the same time the PLO was given an observer status in 
the General Assembly.14 In the scope of only five years, the Palestinian case was upgraded from a 
refugee problem to a claim for the independent Palestinian state. The Nonaligned had a major role in  
that process. In the same period the PLO was recognised as the representative of the Palestinian 
people and the Palestinian struggle had become the focal point of the Middle East conflict in the years  
to come. It is also possible to trace the way in which the attitudes of the Nonaligned members were 
changing over the years. This attitude had changed dramatically since 1969 24th General Assembly 
Session when, although the majority of the Nonaligned countries were pro-Palestinian, there were 
member  countries  that  were  more  inclined  toward  Israel.  In  1974,  at  the  29th General  Assembly 
Session all member countries without exception were very pro-Palestinian. 
It  is  not  surprising that  the first  contacts  between Palestinian organisations and Yugoslav 
government were established between 1956 and 1967 in the period of the strongest Yugo-Egyptian 
relations, because United Arab Republic was the main supporter of the newly founded Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation. In this period Yugoslavia observed the Palestinian question from a distance,  
but not without interest. Yugoslav diplomats in Cairo sent reports about the activities of Palestinian 
organisations and the United Arab Republic’s support for the Palestinian cause. An important event  
that raised the interest of Yugoslav diplomacy in the Palestinian question was the 1964 Arab Summit in 
Cairo,  at  which the Palestinian problem was brought  to  an international  level  and stopped being  
treated as a local Middle Eastern problem. Yugoslav diplomats were aware of the fact that the Summit 
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international  recognition,  once  the  Palestinian  state  was  established.  Belgrade  was  particularly 
interested in the Summit decision to raise the Palestinian question at the next Nonaligned conference 
and demanded the recognition of the Palestinian government.15 Yugoslav diplomats also noticed a 
change in the Anti-Israeli rhetoric, especially in the Egyptian newspapers, since Arab states realized 
that explicit calls for the destruction of the Israeli state were counterproductive. Therefore the terms 
liquidation and destruction were replaced with more subtle phrases such as the achievement of the  
rights of the Palestinian Arabs. A general  Yugoslav assessment  was that  the UAR was using the 
Palestinian question in order to reaffirm its international position with Israel. At that time, in spite of  
continuous objections  from Arab governments  to  Yugoslav  relations with  Israel,  primarily  to  trade 
expansion, Yugoslavia still maintained a formal level of political and economic relations with Israel. 
Yugoslav press, however, was pressurised to adjust its reporting on Israel, in the sense that affirmative 
writings  on Israel  should  not  be  construed  as  support  for  Israeli  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  In 
addition, Yugoslav diplomacy had a firm policy of discouraging radical moves of Arab countries and of  
supporting  the  realisation  of  Palestinian  rights  through legitimate  means,  particularly  through  the 
activities in the United Nations.16 
The PLO had shown interest in establishing contacts with the Yugoslav government soon after  
its foundation in 1964.17 In November 1964 Ahmed Shuqairy, the first chairman of the PLO sent a 
message to the Yugoslav foreign secretary Koča Popović with the request to host a member of the 
PLO Executive Committee and the head of the PLO office in New York Izzat Tannus who was about to 
visit Yugoslavia. In his letter Shuqairy was asking Popović to approve of the establishing of the PLO 
office  in  Belgrade.  Although  the  Palestinian  request  was  rejected,  Yugoslav  government  allowed 
contact with the PLO through Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY).18 
In May 1965, Yusuf Abdo another PLO member visited Yugoslavia. Abdo studied in Yugoslavia 
from 1959 to 1963, and he came to Yugoslavia with a written recommendation from Shuqairy to Koča 
Popović. Abdo was chosen by the PLO leadership to be the head of the future PLO office in Belgrade.  
Considering the help Yugoslavia was offering to other national liberation movements, he was hoping to 
find the same kind of understanding for the Palestinian problem. Branko Drašković, Yugoslav foreign 
secretariat official tried to convince Abdo that there was no need for the opening of the PLO office in  
Belgrade, since there were other ways of establishing cooperation and contact. Yugoslavia dealt with 
similar organisations through formal cooperation, which depended on current conditions without this 
affecting their quality. The Yugoslav suggestion was that the PLO recommend one of the Palestinian 
students as a connection with SAWPY as an informal way of representing the PLO in Yugoslavia. At 
that  moment,  formal  establishment  of  a  PLO  office  had  to  be  postponed  indefinitely.  Abdo  was 
15 DASMIP, 413029, Telegram 88, Bagdad, 15. 02. 1964.
16 DASMIP,  PA,  1964,  fasc.  124,  dos.  12,  417594,  Materijal  o  novim momentima  u  razvoju  palestinskog 
problema, 19. 04. 1964; 428839, Telegram from the Embassy of SFRY to SSFA, 27. 04. 1964.
17 PLO was founded in May 1964 at the meeting of the Palestine National Council in East Jerusalem. 
18 SAWPY was the main Yugoslav institution that held contacts with the world socialist and communist parties, 
as well as with national liberation movements.
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obviously not satisfied with the Yugoslav attitude, and Drašković believed the he would insist further on 
the opening of the office. Drašković thought this should not be accepted. He was convinced that the 
Palestinian representatives do not really mind about the office, but sought the public recognition from 
Yugoslavia, and therefore demanded the opening of the office as a way of achieving that goal. 
Apart from the Arab countries, the PLO had no offices in Europe at the time and only one 
office in New York. Drašković was therefore expecting another demand from the Palestinians in the 
near future. His conclusions were: “It needs to be expected, that in the future, material help will have a  
substantial place in our relations with the PLO. We can not exclude the possibility of asking for military  
help as well, and this already needs to be taken into consideration.”19 
Abdo also met with Mihajlo Javorski, the Assistant to the Foreign Secretary. He repeated to 
Javorski the wish of the PLO Executive committee to open the office in Belgrade. He mentioned that  
PLO already had offices in Arab countries, New York, Geneva, Karachi, and plans for Washington, 
New Delhi,  Beijing,  and Moscow. Obviously,  that was not  entirely correct and it  must have raised 
certain  doubts  with  the  Yugoslav  officials  about  the  sincerity  of  the  Palestinian  representatives. 
Javorski  noticed Abdo's  discontent  with the unwillingness of  the Yugoslav authorities to allow the 
opening  of  the  PLO  office,  despite  the  assurances  given  by  Abdo  that  the  Office  would  closely 
cooperate with the Foreign Secretariat and the Socialist Alliance. He also apologized for not raising 
the matter earlier  through diplomatic  channels,  explaining this  with  their  lack of  experience.  They 
believed that the letter of recommendation from Shuqairy would be enough. It is hard to believe that 
the  Palestinian  officials  were  so  naïve  to  believe  that  one  letter  would  help  with  the  Yugoslav  
authorities.  That  was probably,  as Drašković  mentioned in his  report,  an attempt  to  obtain  public 
recognition from Yugoslavs20 Interestingly enough, at that time there are no traces of any support 
given by the Arab governments to the PLO in establishing contacts with Yugoslavia at that time. 
The shift in Yugo-Palestinian relations and the Yugoslav attitude to the Palestinian question 
came with the 1967 June war. On the one hand, the Arab defeat diminished all Palestinian hopes for a 
fast solution to their problems. On the other, it increased the number of organised Palestinian actions, 
both on occupied territories and in Israel, particularly as a reaction to the establishment of Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied territories and to the Israeli decision to prevent the return of Palestinian 
refugees.21 In  January  1968,  four  biggest  and  most  organized  Palestinian  organisations,  Fattah, 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Front of National Liberation of Palestine and El Aika agreed to  
coordinate their military actions.22 In July 1968, at the meeting of the Palestine National Council in 
19 AJ, KPR, I-5-b, Palestina 7. X. 1959 – 12. XII. 1976., Zabeleška o razgovoru Branka Draškovića sa Jusufom 
Abdo, predstavnikom Oslobodilačkog fronta Palestine, dana 26. III. 1965. godine.
20 AJ, KPR, I-5-b, Palestina 7. X. 1959 – 12. XII. 1976., Zabeleška o razgovoru Jusuf Abdoa, predstavnika  
Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije, sa drugom Mihajlom Javorskim, pomoćnikom dr avnog sekretara dana 
10. 4. 1965. g.
21 Hartley et all 2006: 74-75.
22 Kurz 2005: 58.
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Cairo, Fattah,  with Nasser's support, took the control  over PLO, and its leader Yasser Arafat was 
elected as president of the Executive Committee of PLO.23 The meeting also marked the change in the 
Palestinian struggle by giving greater emphasis on armed struggle "as the sole means of struggle  
toward national self determination and sovereignty". At the same time, the PLO adopted Fattah's view 
on the establishment of a secular and democratic state in Palestine.24
Fattah's  new influence  on  the  PLO was very  important  both  for  the  future  relations  with 
Yugoslavia and the political recognition of PLO and Fattah. Particularly important was the Fattah’s 
proclaimed policy of establishing a democratic Palestinian state for both the Jews and the Arabs. A 
Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat Report from December 1968 underlined the fact that Fattah’s main goal 
was the destruction of  Israel  as a state,  not  the Jewish community  as such.25 Although Yugoslav 
diplomacy never encouraged the destruction of Israel, this plan, in its elaboration and complexity, was 
different from the policies of other Palestinian organisations towards Israel, and it therefore must have 
caught the attention from Yugoslav authorities since it had many similarities with the Yugoslav 1948 
proposal for the creation of a Federal State of Palestine. This was also a period when the PLO started  
an international offensive for the recognition of the PLO as a sole representative of the Palestinian  
people, as well as the Palestinian right for their own state. The PLO was supported by Arab states, 
and Egypt in particular. In July 1968, Arafat accompanied President Nasser on his trip to Moscow, and 
PLO offices were established in Arab countries and New York.26 
However, the fact that even after the war Arab states had no set plans for the foundation of a  
separate  Palestinian  state  was  a  major  problem.  The  Palestinian  problem was  still  treated  as  a 
humanitarian, not a political one. Until  the Arab defeat in 1967, the policy of Arab states was the 
destruction of Israel and therefore the question of a separate Palestinian state was not a priority. This 
defeat forced the Arabs to start accepting Israel as a reality, but it still did not change their attitude  
towards the Palestinian question. This was one of the reasons behind PLO and other Palestinian 
organisations'  decision  to  achieve  their  goals  independently,  without  being  an  extended  arm  of 
different Arab regimes and their interests. Disappointment with the way Arab countries handled the 
Palestinian problem brought the Palestinian leadership to the realisation that, instead of being just a  
collateral victim of the Middle East conflict, they needed to organize themselves in the fight against 
Israel,  and  demand  political  recognition  from  both  the  Arab  countries  and  the  world.  That  was 
particularly obvious with regards to the Security Council  Resolution 242 from November 1967 that 
tackled  only  the  problem of  Palestinian  refugees i.e.  "achieving  a  just  settlement  of  the  refugee  
problem", instead of offering a solution to the Palestinian question as a whole. 27 By the late 1960's 
Palestinian actions started to change this attitude, which was particularly obvious in Egypt's case. In  
23 Shemesh 1988: 104.
24 Ibid: 58; Smith 2006: 332-334.
25 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina IX, 97/39, Palestinski oslobodilački pokreti, 20. 
decembar 1968.
26 Ibid: 58.
27 Mates 1976: 235-236; Pogany 1984: 105; Smith 2004: 331-332.
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February 1969 Nasser emphasized for the fist time that enforcing the Resolution 242 could solve the 
problem of the occupied territories, but not the (much broader) Palestinian question.  He therefore 
accepted the fact that the Palestinian problem was not only a humanitarian issue, but also a political 
question on the position and status of Palestinian people.28
At the same time, in January 1969, Yugoslav State Secretariat  for  Foreign Affairs  (SSFA) 
identified for the first time the Palestinian liberation movement as an important political and military 
factor  in  the  Middle  East.  SSFA underlined  the  importance  of  Nasser's  acknowledgement  of  the 
Palestinian independence from any Arab country and their right to reject any decision unfavourable to 
them.29
From 1967 onwards, Yugoslav contacts with Palestinian organisations went directly through 
Yugoslav embassies in Arab countries. After the war, contact was established with the three main 
organisations: the PLO, the Fattah, and in 1971 with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP). The Fattah’s representatives had contact with Yugoslav embassies in Beirut and Damascus,  
and the PLO's with the embassy in Cairo. Unlike the PLO, there were no contacts with the Fattah  
before  the  June  war.  After  1967,  the  Fattah  started  to  seek  ways  of  establishing  contact  with  
Yugoslavia. During Nasser's visit  to Yugoslavia in July 1968, one of the members of the Egyptian 
delegation was Yasser Arafat,  who was also a  representative of  the Fattah. 30 He spoke with  the 
Vladimir Bakarić, a member of the Yugoslav leadership expressing the wish to send a small group of  
Fattah commandos to Yugoslavia and train them in partisan warfare.31 His request was rejected, but 
the Yugoslav government agreed with his suggestion to train Palestinian commandos in one of the  
Arab countries.32
According to Yugoslav documents, the first exclusive contact between Yugoslav authorities 
and the Fattah occurred in Belgrade in March 1969, when Abu Omar, a senior member of the Fattah 
leadership,  visited  Yugoslavia.  He  was  in  a  semi-official  visit  to  Yugoslavia  and  stayed  with  a 
Palestinian  student  who  was  representing  the  Palestinian  Movement  (presumably  the  Fattah)  in 
Yugoslavia. Omar was trying to assess Yugoslav will to help the PLO with arms supply. He spoke to  
two Yugoslav officials, Josip Đerđa and Boro Mirković, from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia's 
(LCY) Commission for international relations. Omar was insistent that PLO was relying on an armed 
conflict in order to resolve the position of the Palestinian people. He was also very critical of King 
Hussein  and especially  of  President  Nasser,  who was avoiding to tackle  the Palestinian problem 
28 Shemesh 1988: 104.
29 AJ,  KPR,  I-5-c,  Bliski  istok,  303,  1968-1980,  Informacija  o  najnovijoj  situaciji  na  Bliskom  istoku,  3.  
septembra 1969.
30 Arafat came to Yugoslavia incognito, as an unofficial member or the Egyptian delegation.
31 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX, 97/39, Palestinski oslobodilački 
pokreti, 20. XII. 1968.
32 AJ, KPR, I-5-b, Palestina 7. X. 1959 – 12. XII. 1976, Palestinski problem i kriza na Bliskom istoku, 31. 12. 
1969. 
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publically. Yugoslav officials got the impression that Omar was quite reluctant to give any information 
on the Movement itself or its goals, international links or strongholds. 
He criticized the United States and Great Britain, but was less critical of France. As far as the 
Soviet Union was concerned, Omar was quite unsatisfied with the Soviet behaviour in the Middle East. 
He believed that the Soviets were getting false information from Arab governments or Arab communist  
parties. The Soviet Union did not offer any material help to the Fattah, although the Soviet press was  
more favourable to them than it had been in the past. Omar expressed an explicit goal to liberate 
Palestine of Zionism, and to create a state where both Jews and Arabs would be equal. 
He  was  also  very  critical  of  Arab  countries'  past  behaviour,  because  of  their  patronizing 
attitude towards the Palestinians. Unlike the PLO, which was created as a façade to the involvement 
of other Arab states in Palestinian matters, the Fattah had a mission to liberate the country by on its 
own. Omar claimed that the Fattah was the only remaining resisting Arab force after the June war. It  
paralysed the Israeli forces on the Occupied territories and brought hope back to the Arabs. Only then 
did the Arab countries,  including Egypt and Syria, start  to support the Fattah. He understood that 
Egypt and Syria could not support them because of their relations with the Soviet Union. 
Omar was underestimating the influence and the power of the Arab League in solving the 
Palestinian problem. Therefore he did not accept Yugoslav advice to take advantage of the League's 
support  in  order  to  increase  their  international  reputation  and  influence  in  Arab  states.  But  the 
Yugoslav officials got the impression that Omar was purposely trying to undermine the position of the 
Arab League in order to move the attention away from the failure of the Fattah in gaining the support  
of the Arab states.
Omar made it clear that he only expected military help i.e. arms supplying and training, as well 
as the funding of Palestinian students in Yugoslavia. He was not interested in any kind of financial or  
material help. He was not very clear on the way in which military supplies would be delivered to the 
Fattah, although he vaguely implied that arrangements were in place with certain Arab countries. His 
suggested the delivery to be organised directly between Yugoslav side and the representatives of the 
Fattah,  without  the presence of  the  representatives of  the recipient  country.  The Yugoslavs  were 
explicit that the delivery of weapons was possible only with the permission of the country where the 
material was supposed to be delivered.33 He was unwilling to explain why the Fattah did not ask any of 
the Arab countries for help (in particular Egypt, since it had the resources and allowed them to import  
weapons), nor did he give the information whether any European country had already supplied them 
with weapons. The Yugoslav officials got the impression that none of the socialist countries had done 
so. Omar was quite disappointed when the Yugoslav officials failed to immediately reply positively to 
33 Yugoslav documents show that by late 1974 this kind of arms delivery still hadn't been achieved, probably due 
to the fact that Palestinians regarded the arms delivery as an example of Yugoslav political support, AJ, KPR I-3-
a/91-2,  Palestina,  Poseta  Predsednika  PLO  Jasera  Arafata,  Saradnja  s  Palestinskom  oslobodilačkom 
organizacijom, 21. novembar 1974.
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his demands and postponed the decision until  more information on the matter  was available. His 
suspiciousness, insistence on arms supplies and reluctance to discuss openly, left a very negative 
impression on the Yugoslav side. They concluded that Omar simply wanted to get the weapons or to 
find out what the Yugoslav attitude to the Fattah was.34 Following the visit, it turned out that Abu Omar 
was in fact Yasser Arafat. Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade discovered this only after Danilo Lekić, 
Yugoslav ambassador to Cairo, revealed his true identity. It seems that Arafat wanted to test Yugoslav 
attitudes  on  the  Palestinian  problem  as  a  preparation  for  the  official  Fattah  delegation  visit  to 
Yugoslavia.
In May 1969, Yugoslav diplomats  in Cairo spoke to Mustafa Arafat,  the brother  of  Yasser 
Arafat. He proposed a Fattah delegation visit to Yugoslavia and the establishing of formal cooperation. 
However, Lekić was more inclined to postpone the visit, due to internal conflicts within the Palestinian 
movement and its relations with different Arab countries.35 In spite of this, the SSFA decided to accept 
Fattah’s request and organize a visit, primarily because further postponement could have a negative 
effect on Yugoslav relations with certain Arab countries, UAR in particular.36
Further  contacts  with  the  Fattah  representatives  were  established  in  July  1969  at  the 
consultative  meeting  of  the  Nonaligned  countries  in  Belgrade.  The  representatives  of  the  Fattah 
inquired about Abu Omar's request to the Yugoslav government. But the issues discussed previously 
with the Yugoslav officials had still not being resolved. The delegation further expanded their demands 
with  a  request  to  open a Fattah Information Bureau  in  Belgrade.  Yugoslavs  suggested to  Fattah 
representatives that the PLO should be the main point of contact,  since it represented Palestinian 
interests in the Arab League, and it was recognized by most of the Arab states, as oppose to sending 
representatives  of  different  groups  with  contradictory  demands.  This  was  partly  based  on  the 
information from the Syrian BAAS Party, which suggested that cooperation be established exclusively 
with the PLO, as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, recognized by the Arab Leauge.37 
The Palestinians admitted that it was impossible to send a delegation that could represent all groups, 
only representatives of different organisations. In November 1969, the problem of who was in charge 
of  representing  Palestinian  interests  made  Josip  Đerđa,  the  head  of  SAWPY  Commission  for 
International  Relations,  quite  reluctant  to  openly  support  Palestinian  organisations,  or  establish 
connections  with  them.  He  was  afraid  of  getting  involved  in  internal  conflicts  among  different  
Palestinian groups. The issue could also affect the Yugoslav relations with Arab countries because 
different Arab states had their own favourites within the Palestinian movement. This was emphasized 
34 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX, 97/42, Informacija o boravku u 
Jugoslaviji  Abu  Omara,  člana  rukovodstva  palestinskog  pokreta  "Al  Fatah",  21.  V.  1969;  AJ,  KPR,  I-5-b,  
Palestina  7.  X.  1959  –  12.  XII.  1976,  Informacija  o  saradnji  SSRNJ  sa  palestinskim  oslobodilačkim 
organizacijama, 12. 11. 1969.
35 DASMIP, PA, 1969, fasc. 131, dos. 2, 417109, Mustafa Arafat, član rukovodstva palestinske organizacije El 
Fatah – Vujoviću, 12. 05. 1969.
36 DASMIP, PA, 1969, fasc. 131, dos. 2, 417109, Zabeleška o tra  enju El Fataha da primi njihovu delegaciju, 10. 
05. 1969.
37 DASMIP, PA, fas. 131, dos 2, 441957, 24. 11. 1969.
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through direct contacts that different Palestinian groups and representatives tried to establish with 
Yugoslav diplomatic and trade missions in Egypt, Syria,  Lebanon and Iraq. The SAWPY therefore 
decided to establish co-operation with the representatives of the Fattah alone, as they were the most  
influential organisation within the PLO.38
The first official meeting between President Tito and the Fattah representatives took place in 
November 1969, during his the visit to Algeria. Two members of the Fattah mission in Algeria met with 
the President and Nijaz Duraković, a member of the LCY Executive Bureau. They reinforced their 
request  to  open  a  Fattah  office  in  Belgrade  and  to  arrange  the  delivery  of  Yugoslav  weapons. 
According to the Fattah, the opening of a mission in Belgrade would increase its influence in Eastern 
Europe. Arms supply issue was discussed previously with the Yugoslav military attaché in Cairo. Tito 
agreed with their demands and made it clear that Yugoslavia always helped revolutionary movements  
around the world,  and the Fattah should therefore not  be an exception.  He also agreed with  the 
opening of the Palestinian Information Bureau in Belgrade and promised to handle it on his return. 
This was the first favourable reply to the Palestinian attempt to open an office in Belgrade. 39 Fattah's 
representative reiterated that their goal was the creation of a democratic Palestinian state, but also the 
liberation of Jews from Zionism. They made a distinction between Jews, whom they regarded as good 
cohabitants of over 50 years, and Zionism which was connected to imperialism and colonialism. They 
wanted a free Palestine as a home for Jews, Arabs and Christians, and also made it very clear that 
they have no intention of throwing Jews into the sea. They were not interested in a particular Arab 
country, but only the best interest of Palestinians.40 
Soon  after  the  Algerian  meeting,  Abu  Omar  (alias  Arafat)  visited  Yugoslavia  again  in 
December  1969.  This  time  he  had  more  concrete  conversations  with  Yugoslav  officials.  They 
successfully  negotiated  Yugoslav  help  to  the  PLO  in  medical  supplies,  medical  treatment  of 
Palestinian fighters in Yugoslavia, forming of Information Bureau in Belgrade. But, Yugoslavs were still  
quite  reluctant  to  offer  more  than  humanitarian  help,  since  it  was  not  very  clear  who  the  real 
representative of the Palestinian movement was.41
Mirko Aksentijević,  Tanjug’s correspondent from the Middle East, spent a month in May in 
1970 in the PLO camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. His writing offers a good overview of the  
change in the nature of Palestinian struggle, but also in the change of Yugoslav attitude towards it.  
The main issue noticed by Aksentijević was the process of unification of different Palestinian groups. 
There were around 40 disunited and inefficient groups in 1968. By 1970 they were integrated into 12 
organisations,  the majority  of  which were active within  the PLO. The biggest  and most  influential 
38 AJ,  KPR,  I-5-b,  Palestina  7.  X.  1959  –  12.  XII.  1976,  Informacija  o  saradnji  SSRNJ  sa  palestinskim 
oslobodilačkim organizacijama, 12. 11. 1969.
39 DASMIP, PA, 1969, fasc. 124, dos. 12, 445664, Telegram from SAWPY to Embassy in Algeria, 28. 12. 1969
40 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX, 97/43, Zabeleška o razgovoru 
predsednika Tita sa predstavnicima palestinske organizacije Al Fatah, 11. 11. 1969.
41 DASMIP, PA, 1969, fasc. 124, dos. 12, 445730, 31. 12. 1969.
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organisation in the PLO was the Fattah, followed by ten other smaller organisations, and the general 
orientation  of  the  movement  was arms  struggle.  They  were  against  the  nature  of  Zionism in  its 
aggressiveness, and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate. The PLO was purely a nationalistic, 
not a class movement, and it was not based in one country, but within one People who were expelled 
from their own country. The PLO’s main goal was therefore to liberate Palestine and to return to it.  
Considering the nature of Israel,  no one believed a peaceful  solution was viable,  and a war was 
therefore inevitable. 
The most important Aksentijević’s impression was the change in the perception of Palestinian 
struggle. "Until  recently the Palestinian man was barely surviving in refugee camps. Now, he has  
taken a rifle in his hands and has become a member of the force that has regular supplies of food and  
clothes. The pride of a nation is restored and it is hard to believe that anyone can put those people  
back in the camps. They have nothing to lose and by joining the commandoes they gained a lot." 
Therefore, one could not talk only about the Palestinian problem and Palestinian refugees, but about 
the Palestinian nation that supports the arms struggle. It was not a Problem anymore, but an Issue. 
There were several reasons why the Fattah was refusing a political solution: it would legalise  
the Israeli  aggression, present a dangerous precedent since the UN recognized the right of every 
nation  to  live  freely  and  decide  its  own destiny;  and  the  Political  solution  did  not  recognize  the 
existence  of  a  Palestinian  nation,  as  it  was  the  case  with  the  recognition  of  Israel.  Finally,  as  
Aksentijević  pointed out, such solution would prevent the Palestinians from solving their  problems 
themselves,  as  opposed to  allowing  the  big  powers  to  do it  for  them.  Together  with  the  military 
struggle, PLO’s political platform included the creation of the Palestinian democratic state where all  
citizens would have equal rights. This implied the disintegration of Israel and the replacement of an 
aggressive system with a democratic one. The word "disintegration" had a purpose to justify the arms 
struggle component in a political fight, but also to make a shift from the earlier proclaimed policy of  
"throwing Israel into the sea."42
In  September  1970,  immediately  after  the  Jordan  events,  SSFA's  African  Department 
analysed  the  Palestinian  problem and  possible  solutions,  and  it  identified  the  real  nature  of  the 
Palestinian  struggle  and  its  impact  on  Arab  governments  very  precisely.  According  to  Yugoslav 
estimates, the Palestinian problem ceased to be the only humanitarian issue, but it became a political 
question.  The  position  of  UAR  was  particularly  complicated,  since  Cairo  wanted  to  remove  the 
obstacles that the Palestinians put on the political solution to the Middle East Crisis. On the other 
hand,  the  UAR could  not  simply  withdraw its  support  to  the  Palestinian cause,  since that  would 
severely harm its prestige in the Arab world. The USSR also had a negative attitude towards the 
Palestinian  independent  position.  Therefore  it  forced  its  clients,  Syria  and  Iraq,  to  withhold  their 
support  for  the Palestinian groups,  in  particular  because they  feared  confrontation with  the USA. 
42 AJ, KPR, I-5-b, Palestina 7. X. 1959 – 12. XII. 1976, Palestinska revolucija – Neki novi momenti, 15. 06. 
1970.
The Non-Aligned Movement in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author's permission
15
Taking all this into consideration, Palestinian prospects were not good. This was concluded from the 
assumption that the USA and USSR would insist on the solution of the Middle East problem without  
the  solution  to  the  Palestinian  problem.  Therefore,  Yugoslav  diplomacy  saw  the  solution  in  the 
establishment  of  a  Palestinian  state  in  Gaza  and  on  the  West  bank,  instead  of  insisting  on  a 
maximalist programme of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state. The Yugoslav Report concluded 
that such a solution would satisfy all parties involved: Jordan, Israel and Palestinians. Otherwise, the 
Palestinian problem would continue to be the source of instability in the region.43
By 1971 the Yugoslav feelings for the Palestinian struggle had become much more favourable. 
The Palestinian demand for arms supply was granted, but only on commercial basis, and not as a  
donation.  Material  help  from Yugoslavia  included purchasing  military  equipment  through Yugoslav 
export company Yugoimport, shipping medical supplies, including a fully equipped mobile medical unit, 
medical  treatment of wounded Palestinians in Yugoslav hospitals, education grants for Palestinian 
students in Yugoslavia.44 At the same time, contacts were established between the Yugoslav Unions 
Federation and the Jordanian Labour Federation, that represented the Palestinians; Yugoslav Red 
Cross  and  the  Palestinian  Red  Crescent;  Yugoslav  and  Palestinian  Student  Unions;  Yugoslav 
information agency Tanjug and Palestinian News Agency Wafa, etc.  45 The same year, following a visit 
of an official PLO delegation headed by Husam Hatib and Abu Lottof, members of the PLO leadership, 
the Yugoslav authorities finally accepted the request to open the PLO Information Bureau in Belgrade.  
Suleiman Taufik was the first head of the Bureau.46 
Shortly after, in March 1972, the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, together with fellow Palestinian 
leaders Zuheir Mohsen, Farouk Quddoumi, Taisir Kuba, Majid Sharara and Tawfik Suleiman, paid his 
first public visit to Yugoslavia. The Palestinian delegation included the representatives of the Fattah, Al 
Saika and PLFP. Arafat met with the representatives of the SAWPY, but did not meet with President  
Tito.47 It was the first Palestinian delegation of this kind that visited Yugoslavia. The fact that the three  
most important organisations within the PLO managed to agree on a visit and had similar attitudes in  
separate conversations with Yugoslav officials was received positively by Yugoslav diplomacy. Arafat 
emphasized  Yugoslav  help  in  the  promotion  of  Palestinian  struggle,  and  he  expected  help  from 
Yugoslavia  relating  to  the  contact  "with  our  mutual  Arab  friends."  Arafat  also  requested  help  for 
Palestinian students, a diplomatic status for the Information Bureau in Belgrade and military training 
for their soldiers. The goal of the Palestinian delegation was two folded; the PLO leadership expected 
43 DASMIP, PA, 1970, fasc. 261, dos. 3, 436053, Palestinski problem, 30. 09. 1970. 
44 During this time several hundred Palestinians was studying at the Yugoslav universities.
45 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX, 97/45, Informacija o Palestinskoj 
oslobodilačkoj organizaciji i saradnji sa Saveznom konferencijom SSRN Jugoslavije, 25. Januar 1972.
46 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX 97/46, Informacija o poseti Jasera 
Arafata i delegacije Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije, 28. III. 1972; PLO office in Belgrade was the first  
Palestinian Representation in a European country (outside Arab countries), DASMIP, PA, 1975, fasc. 218, dos. 6, 
43550, Promena statusa predstavništva PLO u Beogradu, 27. 01. 1975.
47 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX 97/46, Informacija o poseti Jasera  
Arafata i delegacije Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije, 28. III. 1972.
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diplomatic help from Yugoslavia in its contacts with the Arab countries, as well as with the US and 
USSR in advance of Nixon's trip to Moscow. The second goal was to show their unity and their good  
relations with nonaligned Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav side offered their support to the legitimate rights of  
the  Palestinian  people  and  independent  national  existence.  The  Yugoslav  report  stressed  that 
Palestinian delegation should  be satisfied with  the level  of Yugoslav  support,  as well  as with  the 
political effect the visit will have in other countries. During the visit Arafat was not insistent on any 
radical  solutions  nor  did  he  reiterate  his  usual  "black  and  white  condemnation  of  Zionism  and  
imperialism."  Yugoslav  diplomats  presumed  that  he  wanted  Yugoslav  help  in  order  to  avoid 
international isolation and assure his participation in the dialogue between the Great powers in the 
Middle East.48 
In December 1973, during the visit of Abu Lotof, member of the PLO leadership, to Yugoslavia, 
Yugoslav officials clearly confirmed that the definition of legitimate national rights of the Arab people of  
Palestine included the right  to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state.49 
Miloš Minić,  Yugoslav Foreign Secretary, had an extensive conversation with Abu Lotof  about the 
nature and future of the Palestinian fight. This was immediately after the 1973 Middle East war, so the 
conversation  primarily  touched  on  the  prospects  of  the  Palestinian  cause  at  the  coming  Peace 
Conference. Minić was frank about Yugoslav attitudes. He mentioned the messages from President 
Tito to the heads of states,  including Nixon, Brezhnev, Pompidou, Brandt, Indira Ghandi,  Kenneth 
Kaunda,  Bandaranaike,  Bumedian,  Waldheim,  Sadat  and  Assad.  Tito  reiterated  Yugoslavia’s  old 
attitude in his message, namely that the prerequisites for a long-standing peace in the Middle East  
were  the  withdrawal  of  Israel  from the  territories  occupied in  1967,  and  successful  realization  of 
legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. He also emphasized that it was down to the  
Palestinians themselves to define what those rights are. According to Minić, Yugoslavia helped create 
a  favourable  international  climate  for  the  Palestinian cause,  but  the  rest  had  to  be done by  the 
Palestinians. Minić was also quite critical about American support for Israel. In opposition to the US 
view, Yugoslavia regarded Israel as an aggressor that threatened the integrity and freedom of Arab 
nations. This was mainly why Yugoslavia allowed a Soviet airlift carrying supplies for Egypt and Syria, 
similar to the 1967 situation. Finally, Minić  discussed the Tito-Brezhnev Kiev meeting in November 
1973. He clearly emphasized that Soviets accepted the Yugoslav formulation on legitimate national 
rights of Arab people of Palestine, which was included in the Yugo-Soviet Communique. This was the 
first public document in which Soviets explicitly recognized Palestinian national rights. 50
At  the  same  time,  the  Tenth  LCY Congress  recognized  the  PLO  as  the  only  legitimate 
representative of  the Palestinian people.  Another  Palestinian delegation that  visited Yugoslavia  in 
48 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/91-1, Palestina, Prijem delegacije PLO na čelu s Jaser Arafatom, Izveštaj o boravku Jasera 
Arafata i delegacije Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije /PLO/ u Jugoslaviji od 25. do 30. III. 1972. god.
49 AJ, KPR, I-5-b, Palestina 7. X. 1959 – 12. XII. 1976, Stavovi Palestinskog oslobodilačkog pokreta u vezi sa 
rešavanjem problema Bliskog istoka, 14. decembra 1973.
50 DASMIP, PA, 1973, fasc. 152, dos. 27, 456347, Zapisnik o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV-a i SS Minića sa 
predstavnicima Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije, 7. 12. 1973.
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August 1974 openly acknowledged that the progress of Soviet attitudes to the PLO started following 
Tito’s meeting with Brezhnev in Kiev in November 1973. Miloš Minić used this opportunity to present 
Yugoslavia’s  attitude  that  a  new document  on the  Palestinian problem needed to  be drafted,  as 
opposed to simply revising the Resolution 242.51
Arafat third visit to Yugoslavia was in December 1974. This time he met with President Tito 
and it was their first meeting in Yugoslavia. According to Yugoslav diplomats, the PLO had already  
achieved its full affirmation and international recognition at this point. Arafat had plans to visit Moscow 
before Belgrade, and Yugoslav diplomats had information that he would try to obtain material help  
from the Soviets, and consult  with them on the establishment of the Palestinian government. The 
same source  reported  to  Yugoslavs  that  Yugoslavia  would  be  asked  for  political,  as  opposed  to 
material help, due to its unique position within the international community.
Belgrade expected Arafat to inquire about Yugoslav attitude on the recognition of the future 
Palestinian  government.  Yugoslav  diplomacy  also  expected  the  question  on  the  status  of  the 
Information Bureau in  Belgrade.  The Palestinians  wished to  upgrade the Bureau to  the status of 
diplomatic  representation,  but  the  SSFA was  reluctant  to  do  so  before  the  establishing  of  the 
Palestinian government and clearer plans on the future  of the Palestinian state. 52 Yugoslavia was 
apprehensive of potential Palestinian plans to influence the Nonaligned movement and its members at 
the forthcoming UN General Assembly, in order to exclude Israel from the UN should Israel refuse to 
withdraw from the Occupied territories and hence not  recognise the rights of  the Arab people  of 
Palestine. The SSFA estimated that the PLO had more chances of achieving its goals if it did not insist  
on radical  solutions. Arafat's speech at the UN General Assembly emphasised the creation of the  
single Palestinian state, and negated Israel's existence. This was not received well, and consequently 
had negative effects on the adoption of the General Assembly resolution on Palestine.53 
In  his  meeting  with  the  Yugoslav  Prime  Minister  D  emal  Bijedić,  Arafat  emphasized  the 
Yugoslav’s role in drafting the resolution on the Palestinian question at the Nonaligend summit  in 
Algeria. Arafat particularly wanted to emphasise Tito's role in influencing the Soviet attitude, which was 
clear  when the  Palestinian  national  rights  were  mentioned  for  the  first  time in  an official  Soviet-
Yugoslav Communiqué following the meeting in Kiev.54 He also asked for Yugoslav advice on the 
formation  of  the  Palestinian  government,  since  Yugoslavia  had  a  major  role  in  the  Nonaligned 
Movement,  and could  influence the  socialist,  the  Western  and  the  Latin  American countries.  Tito 
51 AJ, 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Palestina, 1976-1989, IX, 97/53, Izveštaj o poseti delegacije 
Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije Jugoslaviji – od 11. do 14. avgusta 1974. g., 30. avgust 1974.
52 Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with the State of Palestine in April 1989. At the same time the 
PLO Information Bureau acquired the status of an Embassy.
53 AJ,  KPR,  I-3-a/91-2,  Palestina,  Poseta  Predsednika  PLO  Jasera  Arafata,  Podsetnik  za  razgovore  sa 
Predsednikom Palestinske Oslobodilačke organizacije  Jasera  Arafata,  1.  Decembar  1974;  General  Assembly 
Resolutions 3236 (XXIX), Question of Palestine and 3237 (XXIX), Observer Status for the Palestine Liberation  
Organisation, voted on 22 November 1974.
54 Doprinos daljnjem jačanju prijateljstva i suradnje, Borba, 16 November 1973.
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advised Arafat to wait with the proclamation of the Palestinian government which Arafat accepted. Tito 
also emphasized the new post 1967 situation, especially in the UN, and reiterated his remarks to 
Nasser  that  the  policy  of  throwing  Israel  into  the  sea  was a  mistake,  which  was  undoubtedly  a 
message to Arafat and a reaction to his speech at the United Nations.55 
A similar  situation  occurred  in  1975  when  the  PLO  started  an  initiative  at  UN  General  
Assembly to accept  the amendment of  Zionism as a source of racial  discrimination,  as part  of  a 
Resolution on a decade of fight against racism and racial discrimination. Diplomats from Yugoslav UN 
Mission  clearly  emphasized  to  the  Palestinian  delegation  that  this  action  should  have  been 
coordinated with other Nonaligned members and that  such direct  comparison of  Zionism to racial 
discrimination would only harm the Nonaligned efforts to further isolate Israel.56
The Question of terrorism was always current  when dealing with the Palestinian problem. 
Namely, Palestinian struggle was more a partisan warfare than a conventional war. Yugoslavia made a 
very  clear  distinction  between  the  Palestinian  armed  struggle  against  Israel,  in  the  Occupied 
territories,  and  the  classic  terrorist  action  such  as  airplane  hijacking.  However,  Yugoslav  and 
Palestinian official bilateral meetings show no mention of the terrorist problem, in spite the fact that  
Palestinian terrorism obviously drew Yugoslav attention. During his visit to Yugoslavia in September in 
1970, President Richard Nixon discussed this issue openly with Yugoslav officials. He requested that 
Yugoslavia influence Palestinian leaders to stop with the airplane hijacking practice. Mirko Tepavac, 
Yugoslav foreign secretary clearly stated that Yugoslavia had issued a note to Palestinians warning 
them that these acts would harm their cause before world public opinion. Tito also remarked that such 
activities represented criminal acts and should not be allowed to continue.57 This was probably one of 
the reasons why the Yugoslavs were careful in establishing relations with Palestinian organisations. 
Although they were aware that certain organisations within the PLO, such as the PLFP, and even the 
Fattah, with its alleged links to the Black September organisation, were involved in terrorist actions, it 
is clear from available document that the Yugoslav government did not approve of such actions, nor 
did it sponsor them in any way.
Conclusion
The Yugoslav policy in the Middle East was primarily conditioned by two factors. On the one 
hand, with the realities of the Cold War world; On the other, with the transformation of its foreign policy  
following the 1948 split with Stalin. After the 1956 Suez crisis, when the Mediterranean became fully 
55 AJ,  KPR,  I-3-a/91-2,  Palestina,  Poseta  Predsednika  PLO  Jasera  Arafata,  Zabeleška  o  razgovoru  druga 
Predsednika sa Jaserom Arafatom, predsednikom Izvršnog komiteta Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije koji 
je vođen 3. decembra 1974. godine na Brdu kod Kranja.
56 DASMIP, PA, 1975, fasc. 218, dos. 9m 448048, Problemi oko amandmana PLO cionizmu u trećem komitetu. 
57 FRUS,  Vol  XIX, Foreign  Relations,  1969-1976,  Eastern  Europe;  Eastern  Mediterranean,  1969-1972; 
Yugoslavia, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/97933.pdf
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exposed to the Cold war, these new aspects of Yugoslav foreign policy started to show significant 
results, followed by increasing influence and reputation among the Third world countries. The greatest  
Yugoslav contribution to the affirmation of Palestinian rights was undoubtedly related to its activities in 
the Nonaligned Movement. 
Yugoslavia’s true strength in dealing with the Palestinian problem, and the Middle Eastern 
crisis in general, lay in its impartial position. As a European country, it had no direct interest in the 
Middle East, nor was it burdened with colonial heritage, unlike the majority of Arab countries directly  
involved in the conflict. In addition, its independent position towards both Cold War blocs allowed it not  
only to purse a consistent policy in the Middle East, but also to act as a mediator between the two  
conflicting sides. This was particularly obvious when the relationship between the Arab states and the  
Palestinians on the one side, and the Great powers on the other side, was concerned. President Tito’s  
only  error  of  judgement  was in  disrupting  Yugoslavia’s  intermediary  position  when the  diplomatic  
relations with Israel broke down in 1967. Not only did this move disrupt Yugoslav relations with the 
West, but it also deprived Yugoslavia of its role as a direct mediator between the Jews and the Arabs. 
Another important aspect of Yugoslav policy in the Middle East was its moderate stance. This 
was most apparent at Nonaligned summits and at UN General Assembly sessions, where Yugoslavia’s 
moderate policy provided a good balance to radical solutions from some Nonaligned members. A good 
example of this was the Yugoslav position on the question of the existence of the Israeli  state. It  
consistently opposed the proposals leading to the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. This 
consistent approach to the Palestinian problem undoubtedly contributed to its international affirmation.
The relations between Yugoslavia and the Palestinian organisations represent only a part of a 
broader Yugoslav activity in the Middle East in almost fifty years of its existence. Archival sources  
would suggest that Yugoslav diplomatic activity had a much bigger impact on the Middle East politics, 
that it was thought. This is particularly true relating to the formulation of the attitudes of Great Power 
on the Middle Eastern situation. However, in order to confirm this and fully understand Yugoslavia’s 
role in solving the Palestinian problem, a broader study of its involvement in the Middle East needs to  
be done in future with an emphasis on the importance of Yugoslavia’s intermediary role as well as a  
detailed study of President Tito’s role in the Nonaligned Movement and Yugoslav diplomatic activities 
in the United Nations.
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